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CHAPTER 22
NATIONALISM IN THE ERA 
OF THE NATION STATE,
1870-1945
PIETER M. JUDSON
Under the first German nation state (1870-1945), nationalism became a more potent 
and, occasionally, a destabilizing force in politics and social life than it had previously 
been in German society. With the creation of a German nation state, governments and 
administrators began to treat nationalism as a legitimate tool for the promotion of their 
official policies at the same time that all manner of activists, politicians, journalists, and 
reformers used nationalist rhetoric to legitimate their diverse programs for Germany 
and claims on the state. Although nationalists’ programs sought to forge social stability 
by unifying Germans divided by region, class, and confession in a national community, 
their activism could produce the opposite effect. Issues such as the national interest, 
membership in the nation, or the state’s effectiveness at pursuing the national interest 
became at times the subjects of heated public debate with a potential to produce 
political instability. Debates such as these were hardly new to German society, but 
after 1870 issues such as the character of the German nation or membership in the 
national community became legal and administrative questions, not simply subjects of 
political or philosophical discussion. Germany’s rulers often found themselves walking 
a fine line between encouraging a nationalist activism they believed could help to unify 
the new German society and dampening nationalism’s more radical manifestations. 
This balancing act became especially apparent around 1900 as nationalists increasingly 
used mass appeals tinged with ideological radicalism to question the ability of Ger­
many’s conservative rulers to represent the interests of the national community 
adequately and effectively.
For many years historians viewed nationalism as a tool wielded largely by Germany’s 
highly conservative rulers for the purpose of manipulating political life in a rapidly 
industrializing society. Nationalist and patriotic enthusiasm in Imperial German
500 PIETER M. JUDSON
society, it was believed, had papered over growing differences among interest groups by 
deflecting popular attention away from social and economic complaints.* This argu­
ment saw Germany’s pursuit of an ambitious colonial policy in the i88os and 1890s, and 
its increasingly aggressive foreign policy choices after 1900, as products of a dangerous 
attempt by the elite to incite nationalist feeling and thereby master the domestic 
political opposition. There are two obvious disadvantages to viewing German nation­
alism in this framework. In the first place, while it may be tempting to see nationalism 
largely in terms of the policies and practices of the nation state, doing so would hide 
from view the vitality of social movements in an age of mass politics that wrapped their 
own claims against the state in the mantle of nationalism. Popular nationalism in 
Germany was far more a product of the imaginative rhetorical and organizational 
strategies devised by activists than it was a product of state manipulation. In the second 
place, viewing nationalism as a product of elite manipulation forces us to view it as a 
fundamentally unifying force in society, rather than seeing its often unpredictable and 
destabilizing dynamic qualities.
The proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 transformed the challenges 
Germany’s small and relatively elite groups of nationalists had recently faced. With 
the birth of the federal German state nationalists transferred their efforts from the 
achievement of political unification to the creation of a unified national society. They 
continued to justify their programs by claiming to speak for the national community 
even as their key goal was to create such a community in the first place. From the start, 
the project of nationalizing Germany’s citizens faced several unexpected obstacles. At 
first, existing regional loyalties and popular devotion to familiar symbols, rituals, and 
practices of local politics (not necessarily to local regimes) continued to provide many 
educated Germans with a more compelling sense of identification than did an unfa­
miliar German nation state dominated by Prussia. To local observers, the dimensions 
and qualities of the new Germany often seemed more abstract than real. Despite 
aggressive nationalist propaganda churned out by reputable historians, writers, and 
journalists, segments of the educated population in parts of Baden, Saxony, Bavaria, or 
Wurttemberg viewed the German nation state with skepticism, often precisely because 
the new state broke so dramatically with familiar practices and traditions.^
The challenge to nationalists was to produce and popularize a unifying idea that 
would attract German citizens of diverse backgrounds, religions, and regional practices. 
However, in the early years after 1871, most nationalists produced relatively narrow and 
triumphalist understandings of the German national community. The qualities that 
defined Germanness for these early activists derived largely from their own Protestant 
religious affiliation and bourgeois class experience.^ Most nationalists had belonged to 
National Liberal parties in the various federal states; they were men who had agitated 
for small-German {kleindeutsch) unification under Prussia for two decades. Their 
efforts tended to reach a limited public for whom bourgeois and Protestant narratives 
of nationhood already held a kind of common sense persuasiveness.^ In their efforts 
the National Liberals profited enormously from their political collaboration with the 
Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck, architect of unification and Chancellor of the new
NATIONALISM IN THE ERA OF THE NATION STATE, 187O-I945 5OI
Germany. In the 1870s Bismarck’s policies directed against the Catholic hierarchy (the 
so-called Kulturkampf) appeared to lend government support to a particular liberal 
and Protestant conviction about what constituted German nationhood. It encouraged 
the National Liberals to question openly whether Germany’s Catholics could ever 
legitimately be considered part of the national community. The government’s persecu­
tion of clerics, newspaper editors, and laymen, who had allegedly defied the new laws, 
not only produced a popular Catholic backlash, but also confirmed for many Germans 
that the new nation was in fact a narrowly partisan Liberal and Prussian creation.® 
Their desire to diminish the influence of political Catholicism, especially in the 
Southern German states and among Polish-speakers in the East, was only one concern 
that animated the liberals to support the Kulturkampf. Liberal enthusiasm for the 
Kulturkampf ultimately derived less from questions of Church state relations than 
from deeper presumptions about the nation’s fundamental values. Liberal Protestant 
writers habitually associated Catholicism with a culture of feminine dependence 
unworthy of a nation of independent citizens because it allegedly subjected people to 
an absolutist form of belief and political rule. By contrast, the liberals’ vision of the new 
Germany rested on a middle-class masculine ideal of personal independence and active 
citizenship that they explicitly associated with their Protestant beliefs. Liberals also 
accused Catholicism of fostering international loyalties at the expense of national ones, 
loyalties that they also associated with Germany’s linguistic minorities, most of whom 
also happened to be Catholics. Along with the taint of their alleged indifference to the 
national community, liberal writers also associated both Catholicism and linguistic 
diversity with ignorance, superstition, economic backwardness, and untoward foreign 
influence. Some liberals like historian Heinrich von Treitschke doubted that a society 
troubled by religious and ethnic diversity could ever succeed as a national society.® As 
an illustration of this fear they pointed to the Habsburg Monarchy whose Catholic 
status and linguistic diversity allegedly required the imposition of absolutist forms of 
rule that they considered unworthy of Germany’s free citizens.^
National liberal efforts to forge a more unified nation of Germans that rejected 
religious and ethnic diversity merely intensified ideological division at every level of 
society. In political terms, the Kulturkampf helped create a mass-based Catholic Center 
Party that sought to unite German Catholics of all classes and regions in defense 
against state persecution. In social and cultural terms the Kulturkampf also produced 
popular irritation and some suspicion against the very idea of nation. To some 
Germans the public invocations of the ‘nation’ in local rituals implied the Liberals’ 
particular version of nationhood, and this is reflected in accounts of failed local 
celebrations of national unity in the 1870s and early 1880s. While specific commemora­
tions of the war against France appealed to most Germans, for example, they tended to 
view annual Sedan day celebrations as National Liberal events.®
Over time, the end to the Kulturkampf policies, and the increasing experience of 
living in a German nation state made nationalism a more popular phenomenon 
throughout Germany. By the 1890s nationalists had more successfully linked inclusive 
concepts of nation to familiar local traditions and loyalties.® With the waning of the
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Kulturkampf in the i88os, the goals of the state in propagating nationalist values and 
ideologies had also parted company from the efforts of the early nationalist activists. 
Reversing course, the state gradually sought to integrate Germany’s Catholics more 
fully into the national community. Official state nationalism sought to stabilize society 
by minimizing the confessional and regional conflicts of an earlier era and by unifying 
different social forces around policies that appealed specifically to nationalist or 
patriotic sentiment. Some versions of this Sammlungspolitik tried to unify differing 
groups on the basis of their common support for German colonialism, or, more 
frequently, on the basis of their common hostility to internationalist socialism. By 
the 1890s, the rhetorical challenges posed by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to the 
regime offered Germany’s chancellors promising new opportunities to build coalitions 
among a broad array of groups whose joint antipathy to socialism purchased a tenuous 
nationalist unity.
Despite the ideological attractions of this Sammlungspolitik, many nationalist acti­
vists and organizations refused to follow the lead of the state, treating such initiatives 
with caution and even with cynicism and suspicion. Those activists who had seen 
Catholicism as a fundamental danger to the German nation, for example, did not 
simply abandon their anti-Catholicism just because Bismarck had done so. At issue for 
them was not national unification, but rather the terms under which it would be 
accomplished; not the national community as a fact, but the way that this community 
was to be imagined.i“ Many Protestant liberals continued to assert their highly specific 
vision of the nation for Germany, warning that accommodation with Catholicism 
would undermine precisely those qualities that made the German nation distinctive 
and strong. In 1887, for example, the founders of an organization designed to build 
support for this perspective, the Protestant League, typically asserted that while gov­
ernment concessions to Catholics might purchase a degree of national unity, it would 
be at the cost of subverting the very character and identity of the nation.
In the 1880s, thanks largely to Bismarck’s enormous personal prestige in nationalist 
circles, this kind of rivalry between proponents of state and more narrowly defined 
forms of nationalism had remained muted. Another issue that rallied nationalists 
behind the state and where both appeared to share a more ethnic definition of nation 
was in their common desire for a Germanization of Prussia’s Eastern provinces in the 
1880s. In 1871 Germany’s Polish-speakers had comprised around 6% of the population 
of the new state.“ This seemingly small percentage masked the fact that in severd 
Prussian districts, Polish speakers constituted over 80% of the population, Bismarck s 
pursuit of the Kulturkampf in the 1870s had derived in part from his concern 
about potential resistance to the new state from Polish-speaking Catholics. Many of 
Bismarck’s subsequent policies, including limiting the use of Polish language m the 
public sphere and weakening the influence of the Catholic Church, constituted forcible 
attempts to assimilate Germany’s Polish-speaking citizens into a German national 
community.i^ When these measures failed over time to produce the desired results, 
however, Bismarck sought to diminish the size of the Polish-speaking popula­
tion through even harsher measures that included the outright deportation of
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(non-citizen) migrant laborers to Russia. To support these ends the Prussian govern­
ment had long pursued a small-scale policy of German ethnic land colonization in the 
East, founding a Royal Prussian Settlement Commission in 1866 that bought land held 
by Polish estate owners, divided it up, and sold parcels at subsidized rates to German 
farmers from the West.^'* Over time, however, the colonization policy had aggravated 
relations between the more radical nationalists and traditional conservatives in Prussia. 
Conservatives especially large estate owners—relied on cheap Polish-speaking migrant 
labor from Russia and opposed nationalist demands to end this practice. Radical nation­
alists meanwhile, dissatisfied with the small-scale efforts of the colonization commission, 
demanded an end to the migration of cheap labor into Germany and the forcible division 
of more Polish estates into family-sized plots to benefit German settlers.
The government’s ambivalent policies—what nationalists would call half meas- 
reflected its attempt to balance its concerns about the potentially subversive 
activities of Polish nationalist activists against the need for agricultural labor on the 
great estates. However the nationalist presumption (German or Polish) that use of the 
Polish language somehow expressed an individual’s Polish national loyalty or rejection 
of Germany reflected a fundamental misreading of local conditions. Whether or to 
what extent Poles (those with a sense of Polish national identity) and Polish-speakers in 
Prussia identified with any nation is a question that cannot easily be answered, as 
several local studies have demonstrated. The very idea of understanding Germany’s 
Eastern borderland regions primarily in terms of a war to the death between Poles and 
Germans was more often a projection by German and Polish nationalists of their own 
thinking onto events in these regions. Many Polish speakers, for example, considered 
themselves to be loyal citizens of Imperial Germany, and daily life in Silesia or Posen 
bore little resemblance to the stories of eternal nationalist struggle propagated by 
activists. Nor did long-term voting patterns in the East betray fundamental or authen­
tic national loyalties. The degree to which Polish-speaking Prussians gave their votes to 
Polish nationalist parties or to the (German) Catholic Center Party in Silesia, for 
example, depended more on the situational ability of one or the other party to 
represent issues of local concern, than on the national identification of their voters.^®
The government’s periodic bans on Polish language schools or the use of Polish in 
public suggested that the government believed that Germany’s Polish-speakers could 
become Germans over time, and that this would essentially solve what both nationalists 
and the government saw as a national problem in the East. Nationalists in turn 
supported the government’s harsh language policies, but they often held different 
beliefs about the possibilities of assimilating Slavic peoples to the German nation. 
Their ambivalence on this issue was itself a product of their own activism: the more 
activists emphasized the distinctive nature of German ethnicity in the East, the less they 
could imagine the successful Germanization of other peoples. If, indeed, Germans and 
Poles fundamentally differed from each other, then policies of assimUation could 
hardly resolve the national struggle.
After Bismarck’s resignation in 1890, his successors had appeared to relax many of 
the regime’s harsher anti-Polish measures. With the iconic Bismarck gone, the more
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radical of the nationalist activists were far less reluctant to pressure, criticize, and 
occasionally to attack the German government more openly. They organized several 
nationalist associations designed to mobilize popular support for their diverse causes 
and to lobby the government on a broad range of nationalist interests, not simply its 
Eastern policies. The most successful and popular of these new organizations were the 
General German School Association (1881) (later the Society for Germandom Abroad 
or VDA), the Colonial Society (1887), the Pan German League (1891), the Society for 
Germandom in the Eastern Marches (1894), and the Navy League (1898).
The Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches, also known as the H-K-T after 
its founders’ initials (von Hansemann, Kennemann, and von Tiedemann), agitated for 
tougher policies against Polish speakers in Germany’s East. Within a year of its 
founding the organization already boasted a membership of 20,000.1^ The association 
raised money to support the work of the Royal Settlement Commission, and to furnish 
needy towns and villages in the East with German language libraries, books, and 
periodicals. It also disseminated virulently anti-Polish and anti-Catholic propaganda 
framed as common-sense German nationalist arguments in its journal. Die Ostmark}^ 
Along with the Alldeutsche Blatter published by the Pan German League, Die Ostmark 
played a dominant role in shaping radical nationalist opinion about Germany’s eastern 
frontiers in other parts of the country as well. To the west in neighboring Saxony, for 
example, the Alldeutsche Blatter attempted, albeit with little success, to raise the alarm 
about migrant Czech industrial workers from Bohemia who were allegedly intent on 
founding colonies in Dresden and Leipzig and slavicizing this border region as well.*® 
Despite their growing influence on nationalist opinion in the rest of Germany, the Pan 
Germans and the Society for Germandom in the Eastern Marches did not attract 
significant support from most German-speeikers who actually lived in Germany’s East. 
In Posen, West Prussia, or Upper Silesia, for example, it was largely peripatetic repre­
sentatives of the local or state administration from elsewhere in Germany—mid-level 
civil servants, teachers, Protestant pastors—who joined these nationalist associations in 
the greatest numbers. Estate owners in the region, as we have seen, strongly disapproved 
of the Eastern Marches’ Society’s anti-immigrant stance, given their dependence on 
seasonal labor from Russia.^® Similarly, German-speaking farmers, industrial workers, 
and small business owners expressed little interest in the organization. ‘H-K-T’ stood for 
a radical Germanizing politics that, unlike the Catholic Center Party’s program, was expli­
citly anti-Polish. Many German-speakers in the East assessed the national situation in 
more moderate terms than the radical H-K-T-ers and their outside agitators, as one 
example from nineteenth century Posen suggests: ‘A recently arrived civil servant who 
was as yet inexperienced in the ‘Polish Question’ didn’t see things through quite the 
same lens as did a local merchant who, although a convinced [German] patriot, 
nevertheless found it necessary to treat his Polish clients with care.’^*
By the turn of the century the nationalist associations enjoyed considerable success 
throughout Germany in attracting members and in shaping middle-class popular 
opinion about domestic and foreign issues, from Polish policy to colonial settlements 
in Africa. Their leaders were usually local notables, generally Protestant, high-level civil
NATIONALISM IN THE ERA OF THE NATION STATE, 187O-I945
servants, businessmen, and academically educated professionals. Originally, each of 
these associations sought to influence policy by cultivating a close relationship to the 
government, and most governments between 1895 and 1914 had reciprocated by making 
resources available to nationalist organizations and by turning to them for help in 
building public support for policy initiatives. Ideally, as we have seen, the associations 
sought to add a kind of popular legitimacy to broad political coalitions {Sammlungen) 
around popular nationalist issues, anti-Socialism, or both. This working relationship 
had led some historians to characterize the relationship between government and 
popular associations as a specific example of the governing elite’s manipulation of 
mass politics.22 Yet this seamless picture of synergy between a powerful government 
and an abject civil society hid the combustible threat these organizations actually posed 
to the ruling elite if things ever got out of hand. Some members who took the expansive 
ideological missions of these associations seriously did not want to fall into line when 
the government pursued policies they considered to be too moderate. Furthermore, the 
expanding social, confessional, and regional memberships of many of these organiza­
tions brought frequent challenges to the elite national leadership.23
The most conspicuous example of the threat that these mass-based nationalist 
associations could pose to government stability involved the campaign to expand 
Germany s navy. Starting in 1897, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had pursued a strategy 
of increased funding for the navy that sought both to minimize the provocation to 
other naval powers (Britain) on the one hand, while cementing a nationalist parlia­
mentary coalition around increased support for the Navy at home. The Navy League 
was meant to popularize Tirpitz’s growing budgetary requests. As with nationalist 
criticism of the government’s allegedly halfhearted Polish policy in the East, a group of 
radicals managed to gain temporary control of the Navy League by criticizing the 
Tirpitz plan for its moderation in the face of international threats to the nation. 
Demanding a more rapid and expensive naval build-up, the radicals explicitly ques­
tioned Tirpitz s (and by extension the Kaiser’s) judgment about Germany’s national 
interests, implying that neither man was adequately addressing Germany’s military 
needs. In 1908 the Kaiser himself found it necessary to intervene in the ongoing crisis, 
threatening to withdraw lucrative government patronage from the Navy League to 
force the resignation of the offending radicals.^^
During the same period, the Pan German League also challenged official state and 
dynastic forms of nationalism. The government had already angered the League at the 
time of the Boer War (1899-1902) by not aiding the allegedly ethnic German Boers 
whose cause many German nationalists had embraced. During the 1905 Moroccan 
crisis the Pan Germans again criticized the government harshly for failing to obtain 
tangible colonial concessions for Germany. At that time Chancellor Bernhard von 
Billow had responded by deriding the Pan Germans’ ignorance of complex policy 
issues. The last straw for many in the Pan German League, however, came with the 
publication by the Daily Telegraph in 1908 of an interview with the Kaiser. In a 
rambling monologue Wilhelm II disavowed his alleged support for the Boers a decade 
earlier and even referred to a secret German contingency plan to help to defeat the very
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Boer insurgents that the Pan Germans had idolized. This revelation set in motion a 
rejection by the Pan Germans of the dynasty and the government. The League had 
traditionally opposed all democratic reform of Germany’s political system, but it now 
found itself arguing that ultimate authority in national questions should be vested in 
the nation rather than in the Monarch.^^
These challenges to the government posed by nationalist associations demonstrate 
how easily mass mobilization around nationalist issues might threaten the very legiti­
macy of the state and monarchy it was meant to reinforce. Since 1871 Germany’s 
governments had repeatedly deployed nationalist rhetoric as a means to achieve greater 
political unity and social stability. More recently, governments had seen in the nation­
alist associations a useful tool with which to influence elections and forge useful 
political coalitions. Yet their mass quality made these organizations increasingly 
unpredictable allies for the state, and after 1900 they frequently embarrassed govern­
ments and even occasionally produced political instability.
Radical forms of nationalism in Germany diverged from state-based nationalism 
over other divisive issues as well. Decades of statehood had made official forms of 
nationalism into a generally accepted civic religion in Germany, one whose basic 
symbols, such as the flag or the monarchy enjoyed nationalist significance thanks to 
their close association with the state. Not surprisingly, however, given activists’ em­
phasis on the conflict with Slavs in the East, a radical fringe of nationalists parted 
company with this state-based understanding of nationhood in the 1890s to define the 
nation and its interests more in ethnic or even racial terms. In this view, not the citizens 
of the German nation state, but rather a German Volk spread among several states 
formed the national community. For these pan-German ethnic nationalists, 1871 had 
constituted not an end point—the final unification of a German nation state—but 
rather a first step toward the ambitious unification of all ethnic Germans in Europe into 
a vaguely defined continental empire that might someday include much of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and parts of Russia. This kind of radical ethnic pan-Germanism 
developed in tandem with a counterpart movement in Habsburg Austria starting in the 
1880s. There, the followers of the volatile radical German nationalist and anti-Semitic 
demagogue Georg von Schonerer had proclaimed their treasonous adherence to the vision 
of a greater (Protestant) Germany. Schonerer’s followers never made up more than a tiny, if 
vocal minority among German nationalists in Imperial Austria and Schonerer himself 
was brought down by scandal, imprisonment, and the loss of his noble title.“ Clearly, this 
pan-German emphasis on culture and ethnicity as the determining factors in nationhood, 
rather than statehood or citizenship, demanded a radical transformation of Germany’s 
borders and its citizenship laws, aims whose attempted realization could radically destabi­
lize both German society and the European balance of power.
Ironically, however, as radical activists defined Germanness in more geographically 
expansive terms, they explicated their cultural understanding of Germanness far more 
narrowly. Even as they claimed national membership for the millions of alleged 
Germans who lived outside Germany’s borders, some pan-Germans sought to strip 
German citizens who were not ethnic Germans by their exacting standards, including
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Polish-speakers and Jews, of their citizenship rights.^^ As an idiom of nineteenth- 
century peasant and artisanal protest, anti-Semitism had often framed local social and 
economic issues in specifically cultural or religious terms. The Conservative Party’s 
Tivoli Program of 1892, for example, had proclaimed its intention to: ‘combat the widely 
obtruding and decomposing Jewish influence on our popular life’ and demanded, ‘a 
Christian authority for the Christian people and Christian teachers for Christian 
pupils.’^® Yet this invocation of anti-Semitism that rested on the alleged victimization 
of a Christian population by Jews had littie to do with ideas about the German nation as 
such. Instead, this popular form of anti-Semitism invoked more traditional explanations 
for the perceived ills of German society in an age of profound economic, social, and 
cultural transformation. The political appeal of this anti-Semitism—to the minimal 
extent that it did appeal to voters—rested on the recognizable religious and economic 
images it conjured.
When factions in the Pan German League rejected the monarchy and the state in the 
decade before 1914, however, their leaders turned increasingly to a new and decidedly 
racial form of anti-Semitism, finding in it a coherent worldview on which to found 
their radical activism.^® If they failed to expand Germany’s borders or to change the 
legal status of Germany’s Jews, these radical nationalists could at least impose a racially 
anti-Semitic definition of nationhood on their own organizations. Their own practices 
of membership discrimination and boycott may have had few practical effects on 
German society in 1900, but their insistence on defining the nation ideologically in 
racial terms and their relentless focus on purifying its membership positioned them for 
greater influence after the First World War when even the state began to pursue 
policies that favored a more ethnic definition of nationhood.^®
Racially anti-Semitic thinking, while hardly shared by the majority of the population, or 
even majorities within nationalist associations, nevertheless entered into public debate 
about citizenship and what it meant to be German, thanks also to Germany’s developing 
overseas colonial empire. When German rule over other peoples came to include the 
creation of significant settlements in Southwest and East Africa, race became a pressing 
issue. Settlers themselves increasingly raised practical questions of property ownership in 
racial terms as a way to assert their interests both against indigenous peoples and against 
the power of colonial and military administrators. However, when it came to the legal 
status of children of so-called mixed-race marriages in the colonies, for example, newer 
racial arguments designed to underwrite German power within colonial societies clashed 
unexpectedly with traditional gauges of German citizenship based on patrilineal descent.
Both settlers and local colonial administrators increasingly sought to outlaw racially 
mixed marriages among Germans and to deny claims of citizenship to the offspring of 
such unions in the early twentieth century.^i The courts inside Germany, however, 
refused to follow this practice, often siding with the German men who sought citizen­
ship status for their descendants of whatever race. This situation posed two different 
concepts of national citizenship against each other, both based on theories of descent. 
The new German citizenship law of 1913 made no mention of this racial question, 
although issues about Germans and race in the colonies had been raised during debates
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both in public and in the Reichstag. The law did formalize a right to citizenship based 
on descent, but it did not explicitly answer the question of whether German men could 
claim citizenship for their mixed-race descendants. Nevertheless, the debates around 
colonial practices clearly contributed to the racialization of the concept of German 
nationhood in both its global and European context among some nationalists.^^
When Germany entered the war in August of 1914, the Kaiser proclaimed that he 
‘knew no parties, only Germans,’ offering an official wartime image of a unified 
German national community. War soon offered nationalists of many different stripes 
the opportunity to dream expansively about Germany’s future in Europe, but also to 
delineate just what cultural qualities and characteristics they believed differentiated 
Germans from their enemies in the West and the East. As the war ground on, however, 
the extreme sacrifices demanded by the state of its citizens, both at the front and at 
home, produced a political radicalization of German society, which also found expres­
sion in competing visions of the nation. As in the past, however, the question for 
nationalists was not so much whether Germany was unified, but rather the terms on 
which this unity should be forged.
During the war, new issues also influenced competing visions of the nation. Women 
gained increasing public visibility and influence, especially women of the working 
classes and the Mittdstand, with men at the front and children at home who vigorously 
protested the increasing difficulty of procuring basic foodstuffs. During the war, such 
women came to demand government aid as a core right of national citizenship, owed 
them because of their extreme sacrifice to the national community.^^ This link between 
wartime sacrifice and expanded rights of national citizenship constituted a new way to 
understand both the national community, and its obligation to its members. Would 
workers gain recognition of their unions and a role in determining industrial policy in 
return for their cooperation in the war effort? Would the restrictive suffrage system 
that elected the Prussian Diet finally be broadened?
Conflict about the meaning of nation also centered on the issue of war aims, fueled 
by a protracted political debate of the issue in the Reichstag in 1917. Should Germany 
seek an immediate peace with its enemies, or should it continue to seek a victory that 
would guarantee it territorial expansion and increased global power? In July 1917, in the 
shadow of the Russian Revolution, a Reichstag majority made up of deputies from the 
SPD, the Catholic Center Party, and the Progressive Liberals passed a so-called peace 
resolution that demanded a cessation of hostilities that would forego territorial annex­
ation or financial reparations. In direct response, radical nationalist activists founded 
the German Fatherland Party in Konigsberg in September 1917 to lobby for a victorious 
peace (Siegfriede) that would include annexations in western and Eastern Europe, as 
well as in Africa. ‘For the government to carry out a strong Reichspolitik,' claimed the 
party’s manifesto, ‘it needs a strong instrument. Such an instrument must be a large 
party resting on the support of a broad majority in the Fatherland.’ Seeking to ‘mobilize 
all patriotic forces without respect to political position,’ the organizers scoffed at the 
weak nerves of the Reichstag deputies who had passed the peace resolution, claiming 
that only they reflected the will of the nation.^^ With Admiral Tirpitz as its national
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chair and civil servant Wolfgang Kapp (future leader of a failed Putsch against the 
Weimar Republic in 1920) as second in command, the Fatherland Party swiftly gained a 
remarkable following.
The organizers of the Fatherland party remained purposefully vague about their 
specific war aims precisely because they, as Tirpitz wrote, worried ‘that the average 
German will become fearful when he hears the words Ireland or Egypt, and our 
opponents will have an easy time portraying us as wanting to prolong the war.’^s 
While the party’s rapid growth was indeed impressive, Roger Chickering’s study of 
wartime Freiburg demonstrates, not surprisingly, that the new party often created more 
conflict than unity even among its own supporters. The founding of a local Fatherland 
Party branch in Freiburg undermined the existing fragile consensus among the other 
parties on the legitimacy of the war there. ‘The city’s leading patriots,’ writes Chicker- 
ing, ‘had attempted to revivify national solidarity, to recommit loyalties to the great 
common cause of the fatherland.’ Instead, they poisoned the local discourse and so 
saddled the symbols of national community with their own aggressive political designs 
that national solidarity strained along its many fault lines.’^® One local Catholic 
politician warned against stirring up the masses in the name of nationalism, arguing, 
that were ‘this [same] kind of agitation [to] be imitated by the Independent Social 
Democrats... we should have revolution in Germany.’^^
The eventual end to the war in the West, however, was preceded by significant events 
in the east that played a critical role in shaping German nationalist attitudes in the 
period that followed. The collapse of the western front in October 1918 was all the more 
shocking to most Germans because Germany had recently celebrated an overwhelming 
victory in the east. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed on 3 March 1918, had substan­
tially changed the map of the East, assigning territory as far East as Rostov on the Don 
to Germany, and creating German client states in the western regions of the former 
Russian Empire. Brest-Litovsk stripped Russia of half of its industry and a third of 
its population, offering hope that massive food supplies would soon reach starving 
Germans back home. The treaty also underscored the degree to which the border 
regions to Germany’s East had become sites where nationalists might play out fantasies 
of colonial expansion and radical Germanization. The Oberost, an occupied region 
stretching from the Baltic to northern Poland, served the wartime Hindenburg/ 
Ludendorff regime specifically as the site of such colonial experimentation. As Vejas 
G. Liulevicius has argued, the Oberost command was far more than an occupying 
regime. It attempted to Germanize land and peoples through wide-ranging policies that 
rigidly controlled population movement and sought to transform indigenous peoples 
by subjecting them to cultural Germanization.^®
With defeat in the West, and revolution at home, bands of nationalist volunteers led 
by military veterans, the so-called Freikorps, organized both to battle socialists at home 
and to defend Germany’s borders in Silesia, Posen, and in the Baltic region of the 
Oberost Command. In this latter goal their efforts were reinforced by the allies’ desire 
to use the Freikorps as a temporary bulwark against the Bolsheviks whose forces were 
intent on recapturing the Baltic region for Russia. The dual efforts of the Freikorps as
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they saw it—to defend Germany from Slavs in the East and Communists at home— 
often became mutually constitutive in their nationalist propaganda. In the Baltic, 
Freikorps units sought to hold ‘Slavic or Jewish Bolshevism’ at bay, and to protect the 
German national community from incurring this ideological ‘infection.’^s Increasingly 
during the war, right-wing nationalists had already attempted to write Jews out of the 
national community, baselessly accusing them, for example, of avoiding military 
service or open treachery.^® After the Russian Revolution many German and Russian 
nationalists openly equated Bolshevism with Jews, arguing that a rising tide of foreign 
Jewish influence in German society had produced the German Revolution in 1918-1919. 
This concept of political ideological infection conveyed an increasingly racial and 
medicalized construction of national differences in the East, based in part, as Paul 
Weindling has eloquently argued, on wartime and postwar efforts to limit immigration, 
seeing in it a major cause of the spread of infectious diseases in Germany
Yet another indirect legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the popularization of conspiracy 
theories to explain Germany’s sudden defeat in the West. Some believed that since the 
war had largely been fought on foreign territory, and because Germany and its allies had 
won a great victory against Russia, the German military could not actually have been 
defeated in the field, a presumption that military leaders themselves and especially 
Ludendorff helped to promote. The collapse, they believed, must have resulted from 
betrayal by traitorous foreign elements (generally Jews and Communists) on the home 
front.
During this violent and confusing period after the end of the war, a German National 
Assembly met at Weimar from February to August 1919 to draw up a constitution for 
the new Republican Germany. This liberal document declared that power emanated 
from the people, although in earlier drafts deputies had debated whether power should 
emanate from the German people. This statement did little to settle the issue of 
membership within the national community and national community became an 
even more important part of general political thinking and rhetoric following the 
wartime defeat. Under the new Republic almost every political party constantly re­
minded Germans in one way or another of what was called their humiliation—indeed 
their national martyrdom—at the hands of their enemies. The inexplicable defeat along 
with Germany’s unfair treatment by the victors at the Paris Peace Settlement remained 
central to different nationalist complaints in the 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, 
German nationalists also began to popularize a very different concept of German 
national community than the state-oriented one that had dominated most thinking 
under the Kaiserreich. By eliding Germany’s political humiliation with the dismember­
ment of its ally Austria-Hungary, German nationalists implied that the ethnic Germans 
who had formerly been citizens of Austria-Hungary somehow shared the same rela­
tionship to the German state, as did the former German citizens who now lived under 
Polish, Belgian, French, or Danish rule. The equivalence nationalists asserted between 
these very different populations and their experiences popularized the kind of ethnic 
understanding of German nationhood that some Pan Germans had touted before the
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war, suggesting that all of these people suffered similar fates as victims, and that all 
ultimately belonged to the German nation state.
This new vision effectively answered the allies’ promotion of a peace settlement 
allegedly founded on democratic principles that favored the self-determination of 
nations. Some on the left understood German claims to more territory and people in 
terms of a republican vision of nationhood that hearkened back to grossdeutsch 
traditions first articulated in 1848.^2 Like German nationalists on the right, they argued 
that the Paris Settlements had ignored democratic principles when they placed millions 
of German speakers under the rule of Polish or Czech nationalists. As with the allies’ 
justifications of the settlement, this argument too rested on questionable logic, 
presuming as it did that the common use of the German language somehow made 
these different German-speaking groups in Central Europe members of a single 
national community. German nationalists increasingly referred to such popula­
tions—ranging in size from 6 million Germans in Austria or 3 million Germans in 
Czechoslovakia to smaller enclaves of German speakers in Poland, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia—as Streudeutsche (literally ‘scattered Germans’) or Sprachinsel (‘language 
island’) Germans.^^ The use of such terms implied that the allies had forcibly dispersed 
the German national community among its hostile neighbor states, thereby creating a 
German diaspora of minority communities.
The idea of a German diaspora—of German populations scattered among alien 
rulers—had never been particularly popular before the war, except among radical fringe 
elements in Germany and Imperial Austria. It had never carried much weight because 
before 1918 most of the populations in question had been citizens of Germany’s close ally, 
Austria-Hungary. Perceptions of profound religious, regional, and cultural differences 
also meant that most of the peoples in question did not view themselves as potential 
citizens of Germany. Even in Austria or Bohemia many nationalists saw themselves as 
only distantly related to Germans in Germany, and few favored joining the Reich except 
perhaps in a loose federal arrangement. Some community leaders in these states were 
happy to receive financial or moral support from Germany, but this did not make them 
future citizens of Germany or even beholden to Germany’s interests.
Many nationalists in Weimar Germany, however, claimed these Germans for their 
nation state, and increasingly asserted Germany’s right to protect and foster their 
cultural survival. This consideration alone—the ability to pose as protector of orphan 
Streudeutsche communities in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, or Romania—even 
justified Germany’s entry into the despised League of Nations for nationalists who 
othervdse abhorred the institution. It also underlay the logic of Gustav Stresemann’s 
foreign policy initiatives through the 1920s that sought accommodation in the West, 
while leaving border questions in the East open. Should the map of Europe be redrawn 
at a later date, many nationalists also believed that the continued existence of strong 
German enclaves across the border in Poland, for example, would help to justify 
territorial revision in Germany’s favor. It was therefore critical to support the 
continued existence of those minorities and to prevent them from emigrating to 
Germany. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Weimar Germany became for a time the
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acknowledged champion of the rights of European minorities, and it frequently 
sponsored minority petitions to the League.^^
Forced decolonization in Africa and Asia after the war also produced a tendency 
among nationalists to define their nation in cultural, rather than political terms, and to 
re-imagine German’s global role in terms closer to home. In the past, the exercise of 
political power over territories in Africa and Asia had defined Germany’s relationship 
to its colonies. With Germany’s colonies parceled out to the victors, however, post-war 
nationalists turned increasingly to culture as the measure of a territory’s German 
identity. Some argued, for example, that the presence of German cultural practices in 
agriculture, husbandry, schooling, in short in all aspects of life, meant that Southwest 
Africa remained fundamentally German in character, even if it was now ruled by 
Britain.^5 More frequently, however, nationalist activists applied these cultural argu­
ments to claim territories and populations in Eastern Europe for Germany. In the fall of 
1918 Gustav Stresemann had written that: ‘Perhaps in the future Germany will turn 
rather more to the east and we will find there some substitute for what we will not be 
able to obtain for the time being in competition overseas.’^* Many nationalist organiza­
tions within Germany followed this new colonial logic, taking up so-called Volkstums- 
arbeit, or cultural work on Germany’s eastern frontiers, in order to recover or protect 
German culture from the alleged threat of denationalization. Volkstumsarbeit became a 
particularly important form of activism in communities where German speakers on 
either side of the new frontier constituted a local minority of the population. In such 
places, often rural villages, activists distributed periodicals, founded small libraries, 
built Kindergartens, schools, and daycare facilities, and sought to create employment, 
job education, or apprenticeships for German youth. They also tried to create a greater 
sense of national community among locals by involving them together in holiday 
rituals or creating associations to promote local music, dance, or crafts.^^
But, what were the signs of a local German cultural presence in the East? In theory, 
they ranged from exacting domestic habits, the production of tasteful (not kitschy or 
Slavic) domestic crafts or the ability to transform unfriendly rural landscapes into 
productive gardens. Building on nineteenth-century tropes that had made German 
culture recognizable in the whiteness of a German woman’s linens or the ‘laughing 
meadows and flourishing fields [German farmers] have wrested from a wild nature,’ (as 
opposed to the sordid mess—polnische Wirtschaft—they claimed characterized the 
fields of their Slavic neighbors), German nationalists sounded the alarm. Nationalists 
warned the public that Germans everywhere in the East found themselves in mortal 
danger of losing their cultural distinctiveness to the hostile nationalization policies of 
enemy nation states.^® They researched histories {Ostforschung) that documented and 
justified a German presence in the East, wrote literature that praised the historic 
accomplishments of German colonists there, drew maps that constantly reminded 
the public of the Eastern territories where German culture might be found, and 
produced tourist literature that extolled the cultural German qualities of Eastern 
destinations.^* Nationalists constantly reminded their readers in Germany that, 
as Bohemian poet Wilhelm Pleyer’s 1932 poetry collection ‘Deutschland ist groPerV
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(Germany is bigger!) suggested, there was more to the German nation than just the 
people who lived within the borders enforced by the victors at Versailles. The map on 
the cover of Pleyer’s poetry volume served as a typical graphic example of these claims. 
Here, both the lost territories (Alsace Lorraine, Eupen-Malmedy, Schleswig, Danzig, 
Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, and Memel) were shaded in the same tone as were 
all of Austria and the allegedly German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia, Italy, 
Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Baltics. Together these regions constituted the 
true and legitimate territorial span of the German nation.^®
Both the republican government and later the Nazi regime subsidized nationalist 
cultural organizations that claimed to support ethnic German communities in the 
borderlands, starting in 1920-1921 when the radical Pan German League—now re­
named the Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland (VDA)—and the new Deutscher 
Schutzbund fiir das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum mobilized voters for plebiscites in 
East and West Prussia, and in Silesia.®^ There is less evidence that German-speaking 
inhabitants of these frontier regions necessarily saw themselves as threatened in a 
specifically national sense. In Upper Silesia, for example, the democratization of 
Prussia after the revolution of 1918, the increased influence of the Catholic Center 
Party in Germany, and a plebiscite regime that guaranteed the region meaningful local 
autonomy, helped to produce a surprise majority vote for Germany in several Polish­
speaking districts. Although activists interpreted this outcome as something of a 
victory for German nationalism, local studies of the region demonstrate that in 1921 
many voters believed that inclusion in Germany might better protect the region’s 
religious, cultural, and economic interests. Despite the best efforts of German and 
Polish nationalists (and their media) to paint the region as a hotbed of nationalist 
unrest after the plebiscite, most Silesians, whatever languages they might speak, 
remained indifferent to the blandishments of the more radical nationalists on either 
side. This did not mean that they paid no attention to what the nationalists said and 
did. Instead, the decisions of Silesians’ to support one nationalist side against the other, 
or indeed to support neither side, often rested on their evaluations of their particular 
interests in a given situation and not, as the nationalists would have wished, on the 
basis of a long-term nationalist commitment that overrode all other considerations.^^ 
In the early years of the economic depression, both government and bourgeois 
Germans turned increasingly to nationalist commitment as the solution for reviving 
Germany’s fortunes. Although the Reich government had already proposed special 
borderland economic aid for East Prussia in 1926, with the onset of economic depres­
sion, nationalists elsewhere in Germany increasingly sought such funds for their own 
regions, which they now designated as threatened borderlands. Regional and local 
authorities in Prussia, Saxony, and even in Bavaria, invoked nationalist fears of 
creeping Slavicization in their bids for funding from the central government. Their 
applications to subsidize public works projects or to expand welfare or tourism facilities 
increasingly invoked threats of Slavic infiltration and German denationalization. In 
1930 Reich legislation designed specifically to improve conditions along Germany’s 
border with Poland called for the greater protection of Germany’s threatened border
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areas in general. Almost immediately Bavaria and Saxony invoked the wording of this 
law to apply for similar borderland funds to protect German culture along their 
frontiers with Czechoslovakia.^^
A consensus in German bourgeois circles about the importance of nationalism as 
somehow above the polarized and sordid political conflicts of the day eventually helped 
the Nazi party to build an impressive electoral constituency in the 1930s. Before the 
onset of the depression, Germany’s diverse and traditionally nationalist middle-classes 
frequently viewed Nazism with mistrust and concern. The party’s extreme nationalist 
rhetoric may have pleased such voters, but its socially radical image usually did not. 
And on social issues the Nazi’s uncompromising rhetoric could sound dangerously 
revolutionary and sometimes indistinguishable from that of the hated Communists. 
The Nazi party was only one of several whose campaign rhetoric promised national 
regeneration through the pursuit of ultra-nationalist foreign policies. Nevertheless, as 
economic conditions deteriorated from 1930 to 1932, many came to see the Nazi’s 
revolutionary edge in a more positive light. While many bourgeois Germans had 
viewed the Nazi SA storm troopers as dangerous rowdies in the 1920s, by 1930 they 
often saw in them the only force willing to battle the Communists and Socialists, in the 
streets if necessary. As regional and national Nazi vote totals soared between 1928 and 
1932. the Party also transformed its rhetoric to feature even more of a unifying 
nationalist patriotism and a celebration of the military. In this way the Nazis hoped 
to add voters who feared the possibility of communist revolution, who resented the 
Weimar Republic’s social egalitarianism, and who longed for a revival of German 
national greatness.
The electoral success of the Nazis in 1932 should not blind us to the ideological 
differences that, nevertheless, still separated them from more traditionalist nationalists 
whose parties they defeated. The Nazi vote that reached a high of 37% in the July 
parliamentary elections did not necessarily reflect an unbridled enthusiasm even 
among radical German nationalists for the Nazi party program as much as it reflected 
an exhausted rejection of an impotent political establishment largely incapable of 
pursuing the nationalist interests of its voters.^^ An older organization like the Pan 
German League, whose radicalism was rooted in the Wilhelmine period and that had 
survived the First World War, had not engaged in the new street politics at which 
the Nazis excelled. Moreover, despite their recourse to racial anti-Semitism, the Pan 
Germans had traditionally defined German culture and national identity specifically in 
terms of Bildung or academic education and cultural achievement. It was, after all, this 
traditionally German quality that gave Germans a right to colonize others, and that 
entitled educated men to lead the nationalist movement. Both in Mein Kampf and in 
countless public pronouncements, however. Hitler openly rejected this link between 
Bildung and national leadership, often demonstrating contempt for precisely the class 
of men that had led the radical nationalists before the war.^s The focus on racial 
struggle produced a socially leveling quality in Nazi ideology that recognized no 
traditional distinctions of cultural or class status within the national community. 
This potential egalitarianism, which offered countless opportunities for social
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advancement to people who in earlier nationalist associations would have had to defer 
to their social betters, made Nazism worrisome to more traditional nationalists. By 
1932, however, many of these more traditional German nationalists nevertheless voted 
for the Nazis, hoping that they would crush the threat of communism for good, replace 
class conflict with national unity, and restore Germany’s rightful position in inter­
national affairs.
Once in power, the new regime justified these hopes immediately, moving swiftly 
and harshly against its political opponents on the left and using an aggressive nation­
alist rhetoric of unity to Justify almost every other policy. In particular, the Nazis made 
the realization of Volksgemeinschaft or national community their explicit goal. Al­
though the term Volksgemeinschaft can be translated to mean a ‘people’s community,’ 
the regime made no secret of its view that the people in question was a racially defined 
German nation. The Nazis characterized the implementation of this vision as a return 
to an earlier, traditional social unity that allegedly predated the German Revolution of 
1918 and the Weimar Republic. In its outlines, however, this Volksgemeinschaft sym­
bolized a radical departure from earlier forms of national community. Members of this 
community, it was claimed, would relate to each other primarily in terms of a shared 
racial identity and not in terms of their differing professions, geographic regions, or 
confessions. This unity would replace a republican order that had promoted unhealthy 
social divisions and an artificial class conflict among Germans.
The Nazis swiftly altered many elements of traditional administrative, institutional, 
and legal practice to help to produce—or according to many nationalists, to revive—the 
national community. Domestically, this meant the abandonment of the legal Re- 
chtsstaat and an outright manipulation of law and the judiciary to favor the interests 
of the national community against those it defined as outsiders. The proclamation of 
the Nuremberg laws in 1935 explicitly outlined a new racial standard for citizenship that 
defined just who constituted the nation and who was now an outsider. The racial 
definition of citizenship and nation also strengthened the view that Germany’s legit­
imate foreign policy interests included the well being of Germans elsewhere in Gentral 
and Eastern Europe. In the eyes of the Reich, they too were members of the nation and, 
as such, should be considered potential citizens of Germany. Moreover, some nation­
alists asserted that the territories these Germans inhabited could also legitimately be 
claimed for the German state.
If the domestic promises of national renewal—of a true Volksgemeinschaft—rested 
on what appeared to be an egalitarian vision of racial citizenship, they nevertheless 
encouraged professional Germans to hope that the new order would counter the threat 
of democratization they had experienced under the hated Republic. Many white-collar 
professionals, for example, hoped that the new regime would limit access to their 
professions and restore to them a degree of social privilege and respect that they 
believed they had lost under the Republic. At the same time, however, the regime also 
promised a greater measure of respect and nationalist privilege to racial Germans of all 
classes, combining vigorous propaganda with its racial policies to navigate the potential 
contradictions lodged in these varied promises. All of this produced an impression
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among much of the public that the regime was, indeed, changing the German national 
community by restoring lost privileges to legitimate Germans, while removing Jews and 
other non-desirables from the national economy.
The racial concept of national community turned out to be flexible in practice. 
Because structurally the regime fostered an unregulated competition among its many 
agencies and institutions, activists in different sectors of the regime could simul­
taneously pursue competing initiatives, while using nationalist ideology to justify 
their particular ends. In terms of policing, the regime publicized the first concentration 
camps widely as sites where political enemies (generally Communists) were allegedly 
subjected to political re-education. A stay at such a camp should remind Germans of 
their loyalties and duties to the nation, often by reacquainting them with the values of 
hard physical labor. After 1933-1934 and the decline of political opposition to the 
regime, the inmate populations dwindled considerably. A few years later, however, 
the camps revived again, this time by detaining people the regime labeled in racial 
terms as asocials, rather than in political terms: repeat criminal offenders, the homeless, 
addicts, homosexuals. These were all people who it was assumed regularly violated 
social norms for reasons of heredity. The regime and its opportunistic supporters 
increasingly defined such marginal populations in racialist and eugenic terms that 
excluded their possible re-education and made their banishment to the camps perman­
ent, rather than temporary in nature for the protection of the nation.^*
The increasing use of racial reasoning to explain what was considered deviant social 
behavior in German society also produced potential contradictions in the ongoing 
definition of national community. If heredity explained chronic social deviance in an 
individual, then to protect its health, the nation must prevent those individuals from 
reproducing. Eugenic practices—especially forced sterilization—became a standard 
means to accomplish this attempt to breed certain threatening characteristics out of 
the community. The logic behind such policies rested on an unrecognized yet typical 
ideological contradiction frequently found in nationalism that balances awkwardly 
between assertions of superiority, on the one hand, and fears about vulnerability and 
victimization, on the other. Just as nineteenth-century anti-Semitism had limited the 
numbers of people one could count as Germans at tbe very time when activists sought to 
increase the number of Germans in frontier regions, for example, so too did this turn to 
eugenic policies—from sterilization to euthanasia—contradict the Nazi attempts 
through other policies (marriage loans) to increase the size of the German population.^’’ 
The centrality of a race to the national community produced myriad professional 
opportunities for many Germans, since it demanded both new experts qualified to 
diagnose hereditary qualities that made people asocial, as well as a growing bureaucracy 
required to police racially dangerous asocials. However, whether the majority of Ger­
mans shared such extreme racial beliefs about the national community is doubtful. 
Peter Fritzsche has recently argued that at the very least, Nazi pronouncements and 
policies forced average Germans to engage with concepts of race and nation in daily life 
situations, whether or not race held any significance for them personally. As citizens of 
a racial state, most Germans, for example, found it necessary at some point to construct
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family trees to confirm their Aryan identity (and their suitability for marriage).^* 
Others encountered race in the context of local economic boycotts, signs banishing 
Jews from using public accommodations, in Nazi media, or in the open violence of the 
November pogrom in 1938.
Many bourgeois and politically conservative German groups praised the new re­
gime—and the new Volksgemeinschaft; they appreciated order in the streets, the 
disappearance of the Communists, and the frequent nationalist rituals. Many more 
Germans remembered the period 1933-1939 in positive terms.^^ The regime did, 
however, make greater demands on some citizens than on others in its efforts to realize 
national community. Formerly Socialist, Communist working-class or unemployed 
Germans often had little choice, but sullenly to accept the regime. Although Nazi 
propaganda suggests that the regime sought constantly to mobilize Germans for 
nationalist goals in their daily lives, the evidence shows that the regime aimed more 
to demobilize those social groups least likely to accept Nazi rule. Nazi programs, such 
as the German Labor Front s Strength Through Joy,’ attempted to co-opt working- 
class Germans through consumer oriented policies that would both make them more 
effective workers and ensure the regime a minimum of cooperation among the 
populations most likely to resent Nazi rule. The ‘Strength Through Joy’ programs 
created opportunities for tourism and travel for workers who had little access to leisure 
travel of any kind, allowing them a chance to experience their place in the larger 
national community personally by getting to know other parts of Germany. A select 
few workers even gained the chance to travel abroad on cruises, often to destinations 
where they might experience Germany’s global racial superiority for themselves.*®
Nazi foreign policy victories in the 1930s, from the return of the Saar to Germany 
(1935) to the remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936), offered German nationalists the 
perception of a steady revision of the unfair terms of the 1919 treaties. For many jubilant 
nationalists these victories presaged potential future border revisions and the annex­
ation of more of Europe s Germans to Germany. Despite some fears about the possible 
outbreak of war, Germans welcomed Anschluss with Austria and annexation of the 
German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia (1938). These victories could be under­
stood in traditional German nationalist terms as redressing iniquities of the 1919 
settlement and restoring Germany’s position in Europe, as could war against Poland, 
and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. However, most German nation­
alists did not envision world conquest on the global scale that Hitler envisioned it. They 
were, in a sense, far less imaginative and ambitious than were the Nazis and far more 
focused on redressing the injustices of 1919 through specific territorial revision. Hitler’s 
conception of empire was also was rooted in German nationalist visions largely 
inherited from the nineteenth century, and based on ideologies about the East that 
dated at least to the Revolutions of 1848. However, in Hitler’s view territorial revision 
merely constituted a minor prelude to achieving control over vast territories and 
resources in Eastern Europe that would enable Germany not simply to unite aU 
Germans inside a national and continental empire, but also to become the world’s 
leading imperial power.* 1
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With the outbreak of war in 1939, and especially with the invasion of the Soviet 
Union in 1941, Nazi ambitions turned out to be far more difficult to realize than 
expected, thanks largely to Germany’s lack of preparedness to fight a long war on 
several fronts. Problems with the pursuit of the war also derived from the regime’s 
expenditure of valuable resources on ambitious nationalist population politics: first, the 
immediate resettlement of so-called ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) in newly acquired 
Polish territories, and later the extermination of Europe’s Jews. Both of these policies 
sought to realize different aspects of the broader Nazi vision of national community, 
and the importance assigned by Hitler to both policies shaped occupation practices in 
the East, and made prosecution of total war significantly more difficult from the 
standpoint of the military.
As with their rule over German society, the Nazis’ wartime command structures 
introduced several competing sites of authority (the SS, the Wehrmacht, the individual 
Gauleiter or provincial chiefs in the East, the East Ministry in Berlin, the various 
institutions of experts on Eastern matters). The infighting among these authorities 
produced very different approaches to officially shared goals, such as the Germaniza- 
tion of annexed territory or the exploitation of local Slav populations. All of them 
justified their policies and their use of scarce resources in terms of the racial ideology of 
nationhood, and all produced profoundly contradictory administrative practices.®^
Although Nazi administrators arrived in the Sudetenland and later in the Protector­
ate of Bohemia Moravia seeking to restore German national power and to destroy the 
Czech nation, they soon modified their original intentions. Nazi racial policy when 
applied to Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, for example, looked very different indeed 
from its application to Poles or Ukrainians.®^ In the newly annexed Reichsgau Sudetenland, 
deliverance by the Reich from Czech oppression and union with the larger German 
national community produced ambivalence and uncertainty among many German speak­
ers. While their new Nazi rulers attempted to win over local Germans (and Germanizable 
Czech speakers) with generous funding for municipal projects, schools, and welfare 
payments, Sudetenland Germans were in no mood to sacrifice for their new homeland 
by serving in the Wehrmacht, or paying higher German prices for essential goods and 
services. German nationalists in the Sudetenland had long complained that Czechs domi­
nated the civil service and school teaching positions. This, they believed, would not change 
if German men left for the front or to labor in Germany. Sudeten Germans also wanted the 
Nazis to treat Czechs with much greater severity, something their new rulers were loath to 
do, since they valued the highly-skiUed industrial Czech labor force. The resulting resent­
ments produced regional sentiments easily capable of imdermining the feelings of national 
community that the Nazis sought to realize. It also, ironically, meant that the Nazis were 
willing to tolerate a certain amoimt of Czech nationahsm, as long as it was not directed 
against the Reich.®^
In Poland, meanwhile, a very different situation obtained. In the annexed regions, 
Himmler sought to remove Polish and Jewish populations to the East, dumping 
them in the General Government territory with no regard to food supplies, over­
crowding, or medical conditions. Ideally, after the systematic destruction of the Polish
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leadership—the intelligentsia and the political classes—the surviving Poles would serve 
somehow as a flexible labor supply. Local and regional Nazi administrators sought to 
Germanize the territories under their control using varying strategies. In Poland the 
Nazis imposed a German Volksliste that divided potential Germans in the region into 
hierarchic categories with different degrees of privilege, depending ostensibly on their 
nationalist credentials, but often enough on their political reliability. In order to realize 
its vision of nationhood that united all ethnic Germans, the regime also drew up 
agreements with the Soviet Union to resettle ethnic Germans from Bukovina, Volhy- 
nia, and the Baltics (all newly annexed by the USSR) in the annexed regions of Poland.
Although Himmler believed that the resettlement process could be accomplished 
swiftly; in fact, most of the ethnic Germans who trekked westward to build a new life in 
the Reich found themselves living in camps for the duration of the war. To keep them 
docile in the camps, where their frustrated expectations of land produced growing 
complaints, the regime withheld full citizenship from the settlers until after the war, 
when their record of politically loyal behavior would confirm their membership in the 
national community. Here, as in the late nineteenth century or in the 1920s, expect­
ations among nationalists in Germany about the racial and national characteristics that 
allegedly separated Slavs and Germans on the borderlands produced confusion and 
uncertainty when activists encountered real ethnic Germans in the occupied terri- 
tories.®^ Young, often female nationalist activists who were sent during the war to do 
Volkstumsarbeit or welfare work in the newly-annexed territories in the East, antici­
pated that they would play an important role in a nationalist drama that pitted German 
civilization against Slavic chaos on the frontier. What they actually encountered, 
however, were profoundly ambivalent situations that confounded their expectations 
about national community. Among the local Germans, as well as the Volksdeutsche 
settlers, young activists might encounter bilingualism, strong Catholic loyalties, a 
deplorably low degree of civilization, and a profound indifference to the National 
Socialist revolution—much less to the concept of nation. Female volunteers in the 
Wartheland assigned to help the SS clear out Polish families from their farms and 
replace them with Volksdeutsche families often noticed that settlers from Volhynia 
often spoke better Polish than German. The ethnic German settlers appeared to share 
more with local Polish speakers than they did with the middle-class nationalist activists 
from Germany.®® In regions occupied by Germany, but neither annexed nor slated for 
resettlement, the concept of ethnic German became even more elastic. From the Baltics 
to the Ukraine it was increasingly those who were most fully Nazified and who 
collaborated most enthusiastically with the invader, who might earn the coveted status 
of Volksdeutsche. Anyone who sought ethnic German status to gain local privileges 
needed to demonstrate his Germanness palpably, usually by inflicting violence on his 
Jewish neighbors or at least betraying them to the Nazi occupiers.®^
In the spring of 1945, as the Third Reich finally collapsed, German speakers were on 
the move across Eastern Europe, often fleeing the Red Army or retribution from local 
partisans. Thanks to policies of imperial expansion pursued by the Nazi regime, those 
who had been resettled by the Nazis also found themselves again forced to abandon
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their homes and to flee to the West. Less than a century after the founding of a German 
nation state, the proponents of the most radical form of German nationalism had 
gained the power to convert their ambitious visions into practice. With the full force of 
the state behind them, they had driven Europe and their own society into catastrophe, 
thanks in large part to their insistence on bending the rule of law to the ideological 
demands of their nationalism. Whether it was in the eugenic policies they applied to 
members of the nation or in the genocidal policies with which they targeted its alleged 
enemies like the Jews, the Nazis completely abandoned the rule of law for an order that 
instead made nation (as their functionaries defined it) into the highest good.
The dynamics of an expansionist nationalism that sought ever more ways to purify 
the national community, on the one hand, and ever more territorial acquisitions on the 
other, had in part produced this catastrophe. It was the particularly nationalist com­
ponents of these aggressive policies that shaped both their imperial and genocidal 
characters. However, was German nationalism to blame for the catastrophes brought 
about by Nazism? How exceptional was German nationalism? In fact, during this 
period German nationalism looks remarkably similar to other forms of nationalism in 
Europe, even taking into account the specificities of the German case. Racialized forms 
of nationalism could be found across Europe, from Ireland to Romania. In June 1932, 
for example, a Polish nationalist Silesian newspaper welcomed the strict separation of 
the races promised by the Nazis, ‘in the interest of the purity of both cultures.’ Polish 
activists believed that separation would finally end the national indifference that 
characterized many Poles in the region.** Other elements of German nationalism, 
such as the dynamic sense of victimization German nationalists had cultivated after 
1918 or the assertion that the peace had unjustly consigned co-nationals to the oppres­
sion of hostile neighbors, constituted critical components of Hungarian and Italian 
nationalism as well. However, perhaps the most important characteristic shared by 
German nationalism with its European counterparts was its tendency to conceive of the 
national community in cultural/ethnic, rather than in political terms, even in societies 
traditionally associated with more civic forms of nationalism. In recent years scholars 
have effectively demolished the older dichotomous view—itself a product of the wars of 
the 20th century—that contrasted a western civic nationalism with an eastern ethnic 
nationalism. Wherever we encounter it in mid-twentieth-century Europe, nationalism 
rested on the idea of a prior national community defined by shared culture if not 
ethnicity, whether in Germany, France, Hungary, or Serbia. It was, after all, the French 
in 1918 who found it necessary to engage in expulsions from Alsace, not on the basis of 
loyalty or even language use, but on the basis of descent. The nationalist impulse to 
realize this kind of nation in practice created all manner of dangerously oppressive 
practices across Europe in the twentieth century.*®
If the Nazis were highly nationalistic, the character and murderousness of their 
particular and extreme vision of national community were also no more German than 
were other, competing visions of the German nation. This is not to say that there is or 
was a good nationalism and a bad nationalism, the way some scholars have argued 
since the 19505.^® All twentieth-century nationalisms contain by definition at least the
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seeds of what the Nazi variety produced, from the concentration camp to more benign 
institutions like the flag or the anthem. To paraphrase Hannah Arendt’s insightful 
observation from over a half century ago, the nationalization of European society that 
produced national minorities and stateless people in significant numbers after the First 
World War largely succeeded in replacing the rights of man with the rights of 
nations.'^i This development did not have to produce genocide or ethnic cleansing, 
but it certainly made those outcomes in Germany and elsewhere all the more possible.
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